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Abstract

Since the end of World War II, the United States has developed and maintained its strategic
alliances with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Taiwan, and has worked to contain China
through bolstering its deterrence strategy. However, after a century of humiliation, China is
modernizing its military capabilities, improving in trade, and increasing political cohesion to
become a regional hegemon. In light of these changes to the international order, the United
States must re-evaluate its East Asian alliances and its current military and economic deterrence
strategy against China. This paper will discuss the history of these alliances, the rise of China,
and the growing tensions between these nations to determine how the United States should
approach involvement in East Asia.

CHINA CONTAINMENT

4
China Containment in East Asia:
Preventative or Provocative?
Introduction

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States emerged victorious from
the Cold War and solidified itself as the global hegemon. Pax Americana continued as the United
States brought peace and stability to the international order, quelling challengers through tactics
such as economic sanctions and military endeavors. However, in recent years China has begun to
expand its economic, military, and diplomatic reach to establish itself as a competitor vying for
power in the international sphere. In response, the United States has strengthened its role as a
hegemon and contained China by increasing its alliance posture and engaging in economic
deterrence strategies. As the race for global dominance between the United States and China
grows closer, and as tensions amongst neighbors and allies rise, the United States must reevaluate its containment strategy in East Asia to prevent confrontation and war.
History
Before delving into the specifics of how the United States ought to approach China, one
must understand the history of the American alliance system in East Asia and the rise of China.
Only through careful analysis of the past will one be able to comprehend the present fully and
prepare for the future. Without this crucial step in approaching international relations, history is
doomed to repeat its mistakes.
Origin of American Alliances
After World War II, the United States began to develop military alliances with other
nations. Prior to this, the only formal alliance the United States ever had was with France during
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the American Revolutionary War.1 Establishing alliances with other nations was not something
with which it was familiar. In April 1949, the United States signed the North Atlantic Treaty and
became a member state of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization2. The United States thus
inserted itself into the political and military environment of post-war Europe. Following this, it
branched out to East Asia, forming alliances with many of the nations there as well.
Origin of Japanese Alliance
In 1951, the United States and Japan signed the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty, the
basis for the alliance between the two nations.3 After the fall of Imperial Japan following World
War II, the treaty enforced a pacifist constitution for Japan and allowed American troops on
Japanese soil. This was the starting point for the Yoshida Doctrine, stating that Japan would rely
on the United States for its security so that it could focus on rebuilding itself. The alliance’s
original purpose was two-fold: first, to bolster America’s presence in East Asia in fighting the
Korean War and the Cold War; and second, to serve as a check on Japan to ensure it did not
become a revisionist military power again.4 In 1960, the treaty was revised to allow the United
States to establish bases on Japanese soil in exchange for a commitment to defend Japan in an
attack.

1
Brandon Christensen, “History of United States and Its Alliances,” Real Clear History, April 1, 2019,
https://www.realclearhistory.com/articles/2019/04/01/history_of_united_states_and_its_alliances_428.html.

U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Collective Defense Arrangements,” last modified January 20, 2017,
https://2009-2017.state.gov/s/l/treaty/collectivedefense/index.htm.
2

Lindsay Maizland and Beina Xu, “The U.S.-Japan Security Alliance,” Council on Foreign Relations,
August 22, 2019, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-japan-security-alliance.
3

4
Michael A. Panton, “Politics, Practice and Pacifism: Revising Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution,”
Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal 11, no. 2 (2010): 167-172,
http://blog.hawaii.edu/aplpj/files/2011/11/APLPJ_11.2_
panton.pdf.
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Origin of South Korean Alliance
Two years later, in 1953, the United States and South Korea signed a Mutual Defense
Treaty, which serves as the foundation for a comprehensive alliance that continues even to this
day.5 The South Korean alliance was also forged as a bulwark against communist expansion of
the Soviet Union into Asia through North Korea during the Cold War.6 During the Korean War,
South Korean President Syngman Rhee transferred operational control of the military to the
United States to win support for the war and improve its military capabilities.7 This arrangement
continues to this day, as a permanent American military presence remains in South Korea, with
an American General Officer serving as the wartime commander over all of the military forces in
the country. However, South Korean dependence on the United States for its security has begun
to wane due to its unprecedented economic growth in the 1980s. Since then, the two countries
have been working toward a path for South Korea to gain operational control of its military.
Origin of Filipino Alliance
In August 1951, the United States established an alliance with the Philippines through the
U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty, which became a strong foundation for the partnership
between the two nations.8 The partnership between the countries began when American military
forces joined with the Filipino revolutionaries to help defeat Spain in the Spanish-American

U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Relations With the Republic of Korea,” last modified September 22,
2020, https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-the-republic-of-korea.
5

Jayshree Bajoria and Youkyung Lee, “The U.S.-South Korea Alliance,” Council on Foreign Relations,
October 13, 2011, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-south-korea-alliance.
6

7
Daniel Oh, “US-Korea Military Alliance,” Wilson Center, accessed September 7, 2021,
https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/resource/modern-korean-history-portal/us-korea-military-alliance.

U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Relations With the Philippines,” last modified January 21, 2020,
https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-the-philippines.
8
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War.9 Following the end of the war, America maintained control over the Philippines as a
refueling station and to instill democracy into the nation. Although they signed a Military Base
Agreement allowing America to establish military bases in the Philippines in 1947, the alliance
officially started with the signing of the Mutual Defense Treaty.10 The defense agreements
between the United States and the Philippines were some of the first significant security treaties
the United States had in the Asia-Pacific and served as the cornerstone of American peace and
security in the region after World War II. In fact, throughout the Cold War, the United States
used the Filipino islands as staging areas for land, air, and sea operations. Furthermore, the
United States military relationship with the Philippines has expanded throughout the years, as the
two nations signed the Visiting Forces Agreement in 1998 and the Enhanced Defense
Cooperation Agreement in 2014.
Origin of Taiwanese Alliance
In 1954, the United States and Taiwan signed the U.S.-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty,
which started a robust security relationship between the two nations.11 The primary reason for
the alliance was to contain communist expansion into the Asia-Pacific during the Cold War.
Once the United States began its alliance with Taiwan, it enabled a complete network of military
alliances between America and the East Asian nations to ensure democracy in the region. In

The Roosevelt Center, “Philippine-American Conflict,” accessed November 2, 2021,
https://www.theodorerooseveltcenter.org/Learn-About-TR/TR-Encyclopedia/War-and-Military-Affairs/PhilippineAmerican-Conflict.
9

10
Eleanor Albert, “The U.S.-Philippines Defense Alliance,” Council on Foreign Relations, October 21,
2016, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-philippines-defense-alliance.

Alexander Chieh-cheng Huang, “The United States and Taiwan’s Defense Transformation,” Brookings
Institution, February 16, 2010, https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/the-united-states-and-taiwans-defensetransformation.
11
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1979, the mutual defense treaty with Taiwan expired as United States President Jimmy Carter
granted China full diplomatic recognition, acknowledging the One China principle and severing
official ties with Taiwan.12 However, the signing of the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act allowed the
United States to continue unofficial relations with Taiwan by maintaining cultural and
commercial ties with the nation and engaging in substantial arms sales that are still in effect.13
Origin of China’s Rise
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the next major international power to join the
playing field was China. It soon began to challenge the United States economically, militarily,
and diplomatically throughout Asia and quickly expanded its reach to achieve global influence.
Throughout the past few decades, China has risen to become a dominant power and stands as one
of the biggest international challenges to America today.
Opium Wars
In the mid-nineteenth century, Great Britain and France launched two Opium Wars
against China to force it to sell opium after China stopped trading the drug. China lost both wars,
and as a result, was forced to cede Hong Kong to Great Britain and open ports with other nations,
including the United States.14 To China, this was an unequal treaty signed as a result of Western
aggression, causing China to view the West, particularly the United States, in a negative light.15

Council on Foreign Relations, “U.S. Relations With China,” accessed September 7, 2021,
https://www.cfr.org/timeline/us-relations-china.
12

U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Relations With Taiwan,” last modified August 31, 2018,
https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-taiwan.
13

14
Jack Patrick Hayes, “The Opium Wars in China,” Asia Pacific Curriculum, accessed September 7, 2021,
https://asiapacificcurriculum.ca/learning-module/opium-wars-china.

Michael Pillsbury, The Hundred-Year Marathon (New York: St. Martin’s Griffin, March 15, 2016), 104,
https://thehundredyearmarathon.com.
15
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After the Opium Wars, Europe forced China to abandon its trading system to adhere to Western
economic strategies.16 Although the unequal treaties established free trade policies and benefitted
China’s economy, they were instrumental in building resentment towards Western imperialism.
Century of Humiliation
The Opium Wars were a major contributing factor to the fall of the Chinese imperial
dynasty and was the beginning of what is known as the Chinese Century of Humiliation. Before
the Opium Wars, China was considered the world’s most advanced civilization, yet fell behind
the superior technology of the Western nations, which resulted in its military defeat and
subsequent collapse of its economic and political system.17 As a result, China began to isolate
itself from other nations and focused inwardly on improving its domestic problems.
100 Year Marathon
According to the Chinese Communist Party, the Century of Humiliation took place from
1849-1949. Now, Chinese President Xi Jinping has stated that his goal is for China to restore
itself to the great Chinese Empire that it once was and to overtake the United States as the
world’s dominant power in the next century.18 This strategy has become known as the 100 Year
Marathon, as China seeks to upend the international order in the same time it took to lose its spot
from the pedestal. In his landmark address to the Chinese Party Congress, Xi promised that
China would become a global leader in its national strength and international influence in order

Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State, “The Opening to China Part II: the Second Opium
War, the United States, and the Treaty of Tianjin, 1857-1859,” accessed September 7, 2021,
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1830-1860/china-2.
16

17
Matt Schiavenza, “How Humiliation Drove Modern Chinese History,” The Atlantic, October 25, 2013,
https://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/10/how-humiliation-drove-modern-chinese-history/280878.

John Maudlin, “China’s Grand Plan To Take Over the World,” Forbes, November 12, 2019,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnmauldin/2019/11/12/chinas-grand-plan-to-take-over-the-world.
18
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to build a stable international order so that China’s national rejuvenation could finally be
fulfilled.19
Modern-Day China
In year 72 of the 100 Year Marathon, China has already taken significant advances
toward overtaking the United States. Specifically, China has vastly improved its economy and its
military capabilities to match that of the United States, and is engaging in cyber activities such as
espionage and cyber-attacks to steal data from the United States and threaten the American cyber
infrastructure. Additionally, China has significantly expanded its international influence by
cooperation and trade with other nations through projects such as the Belt and Road Initiative.
Economy
After the Opium Wars, Western nations forced China to open new ports to foreign trade
through international treaties.20 However, the Western influence on China’s trade system
generated significant benefits to China’s economy, as its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has
been increasing ever since China began opening itself up to trade with other nations. 21 Due to its
rapid growth and enormous manufacturing business, China is on track to surpass the United
States in its GDP by 2028, more than twenty years before the self-imposed deadline of 2049.22

19
Hal Brands, “What Does China Really Want? To Dominate the World.” Bloomberg, May 20, 2020,
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-05-20/xi-jinping-makes-clear-that-china-s-goal-is-to-dominatethe-world.

Wolfgang Keller and Carol H. Shiue, “China’s Foreign Trade and Investment, 1800-1950,” National
Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 27558, July 2020,
https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w27558/w27558.pdf.
20

21
The World Bank, “The World Bank in China,” last modified March 29, 2021,
https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/china/overview.

Naomi Xu Elegant, “China’s 2020 GDP means it will overtake U.S. as world’s No. 1 economy sooner
than expected,” Fortune, January 18, 2021, https://fortune.com/2021/01/18/chinas-2020-gdp-world-no-1-economyus.
22
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Military
In terms of its military capabilities, China is quickly closing the gap between itself and
the United States through increased spending and improving capabilities. China currently has the
largest military in the world, with two million troops, compared to the United States’ one and a
half million troops.23 Although the United States is outpacing China in military spending $778
billion to $252 billion, China recently announced its plan to increase its spending by nearly seven
percent to combat the United States’ military. The military’s promotion of Chinese claims over
East Asia are a way of securing the China Dream and the rejuvenation of the country to restore
its former glory.24 Thus, the Chinese military has become more incentivized to take aggressive
actions to assert itself and prove its dominance over other nations, especially the United States.
Cyber
China has aggressively expanded its cyber program and become a preeminent cyber
power, second only to America.25 Its prioritization of computer science and technology made it a
prime cyber threat to the United States, shown by numerous phishing scams and ransomware
attacks that allow Chinese hackers to enter backdoors to prominent organizations and corrupt
data.26 China engaged in surveillance and undercover operations to infiltrate secure offices in

Ziyu Zhang, “US-China Rivalry: who has the stronger military?,” South China Morning Post, July 12,
2021, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3140681/us-china-rivalry-who-has-stronger-military.
23

Nicola Casarini, “A Sea at the Heart of Chinese National Interest,” Global Challenges 1, no. 2 (February
2017), https://globalchallenges.ch/issue/1/a-sea-at-the-heart-of-chinese-national-interest.
24

25
Morgan Demboski, Joey Fitzpatrick, and Peter Rydzynski, “China cyber attacks: the current threat
landscape,” Iron Net, last modified September 13, 2021, https://www.ironnet.com/blog/china-cyber-attacks-thecurrent-threat-landscape.

Nicole Perlroth, “How China Transformed into a Prime Cyber Threat to the U.S.,” The New York Times,
last modified July 20, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/19/technology/china-hacking-us.html.
26

CHINA CONTAINMENT

12

America to steal data concerning overseas operatives and military strongholds.27 Many Chinese
individuals have given military and defense technology specifications and blueprints to the
Chinese Communist Party, which has allowed it to reverse engineer the United States’ weaponry
to steal its technology and gain headway in its race to overtake the United States.28
International Influence
China’s strategy has one main goal, to supplant the United States in international
influence and global hegemony. In addition to increasing its economy, military, and cyber
capabilities, China has improved relations with other nations by aligning with neighbors and
like-minded countries. China partnered has with Brazil, Russia, and India as developing
economies on their way to reorient the world economy.29 In Asia, China joined the Association
of South East Asian Nations, improved its relationship with many of the nations in East Asia,
and started trade partnerships with many of them as well.30 In the Middle East, China has
significantly increased its economic and political involvement in the area and has become a
predominant trading partner and investor for many nations in the region.31 All of these actions

Zach Dorfman, “China Used Stolen Data to Expose CIA Operatives in Africa and Europe,” Foreign
Policy, December 21, 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/12/21/china-stolen-us-data-exposed-cia-operatives-spynetworks.
27

28
Ma Xiu and Peter W. Singer, “How China Steals US Tech to Catch Up in Underwater Warfare,” Defense
One, June 8, 2021, https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2021/06/how-china-steals-us-tech-catch-underwater-warfare/
174558.

Tala Hadavi, “The BRICs were supposed to take over the global economy. What happened?,” CNBC,
last modified April 14, 2019, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/04/11/what-happened-to-brazil-russia-india-and-china-asthe-brics.html.
29

30
Rakhahari Chatterji, “China’s Relationship with ASEAN: An Explainer,” Observer Research Foundation,
Issue Brief No. 459, April 2021, https://www.orfonline.org/research/china-relationship-asean-explainer.

Camille Lons, “China’s great game in the Middle East,” European Council on Foreign Relations, October
21, 2019, https://ecfr.eu/publication/china_great_game_middle_east.
31
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combined has allowed China to become one of the most important nations in the international
sphere.
Belt and Road Initiative
Another way China has expanded its international influence into Europe and Asia is
through the Belt and Road Initiative, which is its plan to connect China with the rest of the world
through large-scale infrastructure projects such as railways, energy pipelines, and highways to
increase the use of the Chinese Renminbi as a source of international currency.32 So far, China
has partnered with 165 countries and spent $843 billion on its construction, maintenance, and
implementation.33 In doing so, it has allowed China to surpass many of the United States’ trading
partners economically and establish itself as a regional hegemon in East Asia.34 However, the
Belt and Road Initiative is currently losing momentum, as host nations are canceling or
suspending major projects over fears of corruption, debt, and overpricing from China.35
American Response
In light of China’s actions, the United States rightly recognized the legitimate threat of
China to its global hegemony. However, there are conflicting ideas of how the United States

Andrew Chatzky and James McBride, “China’s Massive Belt and Road Initiative,” Council on Foreign
Relations, last modified January 28, 2020, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-massive-belt-and-roadinitiative.
32

Christoph Nedopil Wang, “China Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) Investment Report H1 2021,” Green
Finance & Development Center, July 27, 2021, https://greenfdc.org/china-belt-and-road-initiative-bri-investmentreport-h1-2021.
33

Philippe Le Corre, “On China’s Expanding Influence in Europe and Eurasia,” Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, May 9, 2019, https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/05/09/on-china-s-expanding-influence-ineurope-and-eurasia-pub-79094.
34

Matthew Loh, “China spent twice as much as the US on overseas development, but its Belt and Road
Initiative is losing momentum: study,” Business Insider, September 30, 2021,
https://www.businessinsider.com/china-spends-twice-us-but-belt-road-initiative-losing-steam-2021-9.
35
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should engage China. Some, such as President Donald Trump, argue America should take a more
aggressive stance toward China and treat it as an adversary to secure international influence.36
These aggressive stances include actions such as the trade war President Trump launched against
China and the Abraham Accords, a joint statement between the United States, the United Arab
Emirates, and Israel, which was an attempt to quell Chinese influence in the Middle East through
a peace agreement between the relevant countries in the area.37 Those who seek a more
confrontational stance against China have developed a growing list of grievances against it,
including Chinese currency manipulation, cyber threats, and intellectual property theft. China,
through stealing American intellectual property, replicating it, and then supplanting American
companies through price gouging has cost the United States $600 billion annually.38 As a result,
these individuals have begun to treat China as an outright enemy to preserve the current
international order.
Others, such as President Barack Obama, contend that the United States should pursue
constructive engagement with China to welcome it into the international order. Some brush over
its human rights abuses and aggressive territorial claims to befriend it. However, this paper
proposes that a middle road between these two forms of engagement will result in a more
productive relationship with China.

Doug Bandow, “Why the Hawks Are Wrong about China Too,” Cato Institute, November 14, 2019,
https://www.cato.org/commentary/why-hawks-are-wrong-about-china-too.
36

Eyal Propper, “Autumn Chills: Israel-China Relations and the Normalization Agreements with the Gulf
States,” The Institute for National Security Studies, October 12, 2020, https://www.inss.org.il/publication/chinaabraham-accords.
37

Carlos Perez, “Chinese Intellectual Property Theft: its Impact on American Businesses and China’s Plan
to Change,” LinkedIn, December 19, 2020, https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/chinese-intellectual-property-theft-itsimpact-american-carlos-perez.
38
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Benefits of East Asian Alliances

The United States alliance system in East Asia is fundamental in providing peace and
security in the region. During the Cold War, these alliances were essential to combatting
communism from the former Soviet Union. Now, their primary function is to guard against a
rising China as it seeks to expand its global influence.39 To combat China, the United States must
work together with its allies both individually and as a whole to maximize efficiency.
Benefits of the Japanese Alliance
The Japanese alliance with the United States is one of the cornerstones of American
foreign policy and international relations. Trade and interregional cooperation in Asia greatly
benefit from a strong American presence and influence in the region.40 However, the most
crucial aspect of the alliance is its geographic location, being close to China, as it allows the
United States to maintain extended deterrence in the area.41 To Japan, the United States alliance
and assurance of protection is key to regional stability and brings Japan safety and security in
deterring threats from nearby nuclear-armed nations such as China and North Korea.42
Deterrence is a key issue for Japan, particularly regarding the Senkaku Islands, a long-standing

39
Lindsey W. Ford and James Goldgeier, “Retooling America’s alliances to manage the China challenge,”
Brookings Institution, January 25, 2021, https://www.brookings.edu/research/retooling-americas-alliances-tomanage-the-china-challenge.

Emma Chanlett-Avery, Caitlin Campbell, and Joshua A. Williams, “The U.S.-Japan Alliance,”
Congressional Research Service, June 13, 2019, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33740.pdf.
40

41
Jennifer Lind, “Keep, Toss, or Fix? Assessing US Alliances in East Asia,” The Tobin Project, 2016,
https://www.tobinproject.org/sites/tobinproject.org/files/assets/Lind%20-%20Keep,%20Toss,%20or%20Fix.pdf.

Seth Cropsey and Jun Isomura, “The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Significance and Role,” Hudson Institute,
April 2018, https://s3.amazonaws.com/media.hudson.org/files/publications/CropseyIsomura.pdf.
42
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territorial dispute with China riddled by nationalist ambitions.43 The alliance with the United
States allows for increased protection for Japan and deterrence against Chinese incursions.
Benefits of the South Korean Alliance
The United States’ alliance with South Korea is also highly important to strategic policy
in East Asia. South Korea has a unique position in that it is located close to both China, the
United States’ strongest competitor, and North Korea, an upstart rival, as well. Thus, South
Korea’s strong military and defense capabilities make it a strong bulwark against threats coming
at it from multiple directions.44 Specifically, the United States and South Korea recently
deployed the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system, an anti-ballistic missile interceptor,
which is a vital deterrent against North Korean missile testing.45 These systems are also equipped
with surveillance capabilities which make it possible for the United States to better track the
whereabouts of any Chinese missiles as well. The South Korean alliance has thus allowed the
United States to keep a watchful eye on both North Korea and China.
Benefits of the Filipino Alliance
The United States’ alliance with the Philippines is crucial to the American military
presence in East Asia and combatting an emerging China.46 Specifically, the Philippines are

43
Chrystopher S. Kim, “Nationalism: The Media, State, and Public in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Dispute,”
Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, March 2015, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a620768.pdf.

Michael Fuchs and Haneul Lee, “Bridging the Divide in the U.S.-South Korea Alliance,” Center for
American Progress, November 23, 2020,
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/reports/2020/11/23/493041/bridging-divide-u-s-south-koreaalliance.
44

45
Ankit Panda, “What Is THAAD, What Does It Do, and Why Is China Mad About It?,” The Diplomat,
February 25, 2016, https://thediplomat.com/2016/02/what-is-thaad-what-does-it-do-and-why-is-china-mad-about-it.

Michael J. Green and Gregory B. Poling, “The U.S. Alliance with the Philippines,” Center for Strategic
and International Studies, December 3, 2020, https://www.csis.org/analysis/us-alliance-philippines.
46
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essential to accomplishing the United States’ goals of securing the freedom of the seas and
deterring Chinese aggression in the South China Sea. The Visiting Forces Agreement between
the United States and the Philippines is vital to joint counter-terror operations, humanitarian aid,
disaster relief, and hundreds of military training exercises throughout the year. Ensuring a solid
department for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief allows the Philippines to serve as a
haven during times of environmental calamities such as hurricanes that have wrecked the
infrastructure of both the Philippines and surrounding nations. 47
Benefits of the Taiwanese Alliance
After the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, the United States ceased its formal alliance
operations with Taiwan yet continued unofficial diplomatic and military ties. The United States
pledged to sell defense weapons to Taiwan and has stated that it regards any coercive moves by
China against Taiwan as a breach of peace in East Asia.48 In 2020, the United States has
conducted arms sales to Taiwan totaling $5 billion for aerial drones, surveillance, and artillery to
hedge against Chinese encroachment.49 Thus, there is a policy of strategic ambiguity between the
two nations regarding how much the United States supports Taiwan and if the United States
would defend Taiwan should it be invaded by China. The main reason for the continued alliance
between the United States and Taiwan is to deter Chinese aggression and demonstrate the United

Priam Nepomuceno, “Humanitarian, disaster ops training a must for PH,” Philippines News Agency,
March 1, 2019, https://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1063301.
47

Ted Galen Carpenter, “A Reborn U.S.-Taiwan Military Alliance?,” Cato Institute, September 22, 2020,
https://www.cato.org/commentary/reborn-us-taiwan-military-alliance.
48

49
Ben Blanchard, “Timeline: U.S. arms sales to Taiwan in 2020 total $5 billion amid China tensions,”
Reuters, December 7, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-taiwan-security-usa-timeline/timeline-u-s-armssales-to-taiwan-in-2020-total-5-billion-amid-china-tensions-idUSKBN28I0BF.
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States’ strong military power in the area.50 The alliance between the two countries is thus vital to
maintain cross-strait stability and prevent conflict from breaking out in the Asia-Pacific.
Benefits of a Cohesive East Asian Alliance Strategy
Each of the United States’ individual alliances with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines,
and Taiwan are important to stability in the region, but the combination of all of these alliances is
vital to a cohesive East Asian alliance strategy. Establishing a strong military presence in the
four allies neighboring China allows America to continue to power project in the region and acts
as a barrier surrounding China. It is only with all of the East Asian allies united that America can
adequately deter China through its military presence, strong leadership, and solid strategy in the
Asia-Pacific.51 Thus, if the United States were to abandon even one of its allies, its deterrence
strategy would falter. To completely encircle China, America also needs help from its South East
Asian alliance partners of India, Australia, and Thailand. Although these nations are vital to the
United States containment strategy writ large, they are not the main focus of this discussion.
Costs of East Asian Alliances
However, the United States alliance system is not always perfect, as there are many
disagreements and challenges the nations face when determining how to ensure each countries’
needs are met. Additionally, as the United States’ strong presence in the area poses a threat to
China, China has taken retaliatory moves such as sanctions and increased military presence in

50
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response to the allies’ support against China.52 In addition to such costs in an abstract sense,
these alliances have also had a substantial monetary toll on the United States. Thus, the United
States and its allies must also weigh the costs of maintaining the alliances as they currently exist.
Costs of the Japanese Alliance
Although it provides many benefits, there are several costs to the United States as a result
of the alliance with Japan. There is a substantial amount of American military spending directed
towards Japan, as there are several bases and many troops stationed there.53 According to United
States reports, the nation spent almost $20.9 billion on defense over the past four years, while
Japan only spent $12.6 billion.54 Additionally, the United States has committed to defending
Japan in its territorial dispute with China over the Senkaku Islands, meaning that if confrontation
over the islands broke out between Japan and China, America would be roped into the conflict,
which could escalate to nuclear war due to high tensions and offensive military postures.55 The
alliance also poses costs to Japan, particularly concerning its total military reliance on the United
States. If Japan became less dependent on American assistance and protection and instead
improved its Self-Defense Forces and acquired defensive second-strike capabilities, it could
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increase domestic deterrence, allow for self-sustainability, and establish Japan as a stronger
global power.56
Costs of the South Korean Alliance
As for South Korea, many problems in its alliance with the United States stem from
tension over burden-sharing costs.57 The United States spent $13.4 billion to maintain troops in
South Korea, while South Korea only spent $5.8 billion.58 The two countries have been
cooperating on transferring military operational control from the United States to South Korea
for several years. Still, because the United States pays for four-fifths of South Korea’s National
Defense and the South Korean military is not as highly trained, a complete transition has not yet
occurred.59 Furthermore, South Korea sees the United States’ hardline stance on North Korea as
the barrier to improving relations on the peninsula.60 The United States’ harsh sanctions,
adversarial posture, and refusal to formally declare an end to the Korean War only increase
tensions between North Korea and South Korea, who have been seeking peninsular reunification
for decades.
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Costs of the Filipino Alliance
With regard to the Filipino alliance, although American commitments to assurance have
been strong, Filipino guarantees wavered. Since Filipino President Rodrigo Duterte took office in
2016, the Philippines reneged on its agreements with the United States to allow troops and
military exercises on the islands, and even threatened to abrogate the alliance entirely.61 The
Philippines began to distance itself from America and gravitate towards Russia and China,
making it unreliable. In spite of this, the United States recently increased its commitment to the
Philippines, allocating $1.5 billion for its military and defense budget, while the Philippines
barely contribute to its own capabilities.62 Furthermore, America expanded the scope of its treaty
to apply to any ships or disputed Filipino territories, particularly in the South China Sea.63 This
greatly exacerbates the potential for war between the United States and China to break out, as
America pledged to respond militarily to any conflict that arises between the Philippines and
China, who have been operating in each other’s spheres of influence very frequently as of late.
Costs of the Taiwanese Alliance
Concerning the alliance between the United States and Taiwan, the highest costs come
from the potential for conflict over Taiwan and China. Recently, China has been modernizing its
military capabilities and expanding its reach across the Asia-Pacific, while Taiwan has decreased
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its investment in defense infrastructure and military readiness.64 Taiwan only spent 1.7% of its
GDP on its military, while the United States spent over twice that amount on giving Taiwan
resources.65 With Taiwan falling behind in its military capabilities, any changes in the balance of
power between the United States and China only exacerbates the likelihood that China could take
steps to invade Taiwan, which would put to the test the United States’ defense commitments and
credibility as a guarantor of Taiwan’s protection. Furthermore, the United States has recently
cast aside long-standing policies with China and Taiwan by abruptly lifting government decrees
prohibiting interactions between American and Taiwanese diplomats.66 This only further
increases the possibility of a conflict erupting between the two nations that would end in turmoil.
Securing a stable relationship between the United States and China is impossible as long as the
United States maintains its current diplomatic and military partnership with Taiwan.
Chinese Containment
In the Cold War, the United States introduced a foreign policy strategy known as
containment to prevent the expansion of the Soviet Union and communism into Europe and
Asia.67 In the wake of Mao Zedong’s communist control of China, combined with the threat of
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the Cold War, many Americans feared a Sino-Soviet conspiracy against democracy and the freemarket system.68 Thus, the United States began to establish a containment strategy against China.
Origin of Containment Strategy
During the Vietnam War, under the lead of United States President Lyndon B. Johnson, it
was revealed that the United States sought to contain China through military, economic, and
diplomatic actions. The Assistant Secretary of Defense John McNaughton stated in the Pentagon
Papers, which was a report of the Vietnam task force, that the goal of the Vietnam War was not
to assist South Vietnam but to contain China.69 Since then, the United States has maintained its
position of seeking to quell Chinese influence in East Asia. In recent American history,
presidents have increased American military presence in the Asia-Pacific, launched trade wars,
and implemented sanctions against China to prevent the nation from becoming a regional
hegemon.70
Methods of Containment
Throughout the past few decades, the United States has employed several methods by
which to contain China. Since the end of the Cold War, American policymakers have been
seeking new ways to engage and contain the nation through methods such as military presence,
strong alliances, economic sanctions, and international influence. Understanding the methods for
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containment is vital to determining the threat that China poses and the evaluation of the United
States’ strategic policy in East Asia.
Military Containment
During the presidency of George H. W. Bush, the American strategy was to prevent
China from rising through doctrinal policies such as unilateralism, pre-emption, and missile
defense.71 However, this approach was inherently flawed and unsustainable, as no individual
nation can adequately manage global security challenges alone and thus requires a multilateral
response. Following this, the United States then shifted its containment policy to include its East
Asian alliances as major players through President Barack Obama’s “Pivot to Asia.”72 The main
flaw in this strategy was that it put Asia at the center of the United States’ security strategy,
which sent a signal to China that the United States was taking offensive actions to contain China
militarily. In response to the United States’ aggressive containment policy in East Asia, China
began to further modernize its nuclear and missile capabilities to improve its military and
deterrence strategy and prepare for a possible conflict between the United States and China.73
Geo-Economic Containment
After President Donald Trump took office, the containment strategy toward China took
on a different nature. The United States began to pursue aggressive economic sanctions against
many Chinese industries to promote American economic growth and launched a trade war
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against China.74 In July 2018, the United States placed a twenty-five percent tax on $34 billion
worth of imports from China, including manufacturing and technology parts.75 China retaliated
by imposing a twenty-five percent tax on $34 billion worth of imports from America, including
agriculture products and manufacturing parts. This tit-for-tat escalation continued for the next
several months, with America taxing certain Chinese imports and China responding by taxing
similar American imports. This trade war against China shattered global norms and paved the
way for America to continue to pursue more aggressive policies against China. As for President
Joe Biden, he has maintained economic sanctions and spoken out against China’s continued
human rights violations.76 Although he claimed he would remove the tariffs that President Trump
placed on China, President Biden recognized that the United States is still locked in competition
with China, and that removing the economic penalties too soon could legitimize China’s
actions.77 The continued geo-economic containment of China has helped the United States
maintain its status as the global hegemon and limited China’s economic expansion.
Benefits of Containment
Containment of China is beneficial to quell its aggressive and expansionist desires and
prevent it from gaining power and influence to stop it from overtaking the United States as the
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global hegemon.78 If China is to surpass America, many argue that China will export its
authoritarian and communist model to other nations, which would cause others to align with its
model of government and become an affront to democracy and capitalism. If China were to
achieve global hegemony, it could be a recipe for the destruction of multilateralism, free trade,
and international economic cooperation.79 Through American containment of China, the United
States is able to prevent China from being militaristically expansionist.80 If the United States
were to cede hegemony to China in East Asia, China could take offensive actions against
disputed territories such as the Spratly Islands in the Philippines, the Senkaku Islands in Japan,
and in Taiwan, which China believes is rightfully its own. China is seeking to increase its
influence in the region through any means necessary, which necessitates that America continue
to contain China to prevent it from invading its neighbors and expanding its influence globally.
Costs of Containment
However, the containment strategy that the United States is employing against China is
highly aggressive and has caused several negative effects that can only get worse. The current
containment strategy fuels mistrust and increases tensions in East Asia which amplifies the risk
of unnecessary war.81 The best way to make an enemy of China is to treat it like one, and doing
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so would only serve to enhance an arms race in the Asia-Pacific and worsen the security
dilemma between the United States and China.82 Additionally, the monetary costs of containing
China in East Asia have been monumental, as the United States has spent billions on increasing
its military operations in the Asia-Pacific only for its allies to not improve their capabilities at
all.83 Furthermore, the United States’ trade war with China has negatively affected American
trade, as the United States’ economic growth slowed, business investment halted, manufacturing
plants suffered, and many farmers lost all business and went bankrupt.84 China has made it clear
that it is unwilling to continue being contained by the United States, and maintaining this
offensive posture would put the two nuclear powers on a collision course for conflict if nothing
was done to change this.
Analysis
For the United States, one of its biggest challenges is understanding how to approach
China in East Asia. The United States has employed different containment and engagement
strategies toward China throughout the years, and once again, the environment in East Asia has
changed. At its disposal, the United States has strong alliances, a powerful military, and a
cohesive containment strategy. However, recent policies and increasing tensions in the AsiaPacific magnify the potential for conflict in the region. Thus, the United States must determine
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how maintaining the status quo, increasing its commitments, and decreasing its commitments
would affect the global balance of power before implementing changes to its deterrence strategy.
Alliance Strategy
Currently, the United States maintains a high degree of influence in East Asia due to its
alliance strategy. Forward military presence and substantial troop deployments in Japan, South
Korea, the Philippines, and Taiwan allow the United States to have a say in the politics of Asia
and how its allies interact with China.85 Additionally, the United States has deployed a balance
of power strategy against China to hedge against its growing influence. China’s increasing
destabilization of the Asia-Pacific has caused Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Taiwan to
strengthen their relations with the United States.86 America’s allies have also relayed their
concerns about the American alliance strategy as to how increasing or decreasing its
commitments would affect their relations with China.
Maintaining the Status Quo
If the United States were to maintain its status quo alliance strategy, it would continue to
increase tensions in the region but likely would not cause an outright war between the United
States and China.87 President Joe Biden has been working to maintain positive relations and
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communication with both allies and China, in an attempt to find a middle ground between the
two. Currently, the United States’ allies generally disapprove of the alliance strategy, and it is
clear that China does as well. Thus, both sides recognize that something ought to be done, and
now the United States must determine whether it ought to increase or decrease its alliance
commitments.
Increasing Alliance Commitments
Some allies are in favor of increasing the United States’ force posture and containment in
East Asia, as they view it to be necessary to prevent a war from breaking out. Japan would like
the United States to increase its commitment and presence in the region to protect against
China’s incursions on its disputed territories.88 Additionally, the United States maintains a policy
of strategic ambiguity as to whether it would defend Taiwan. Taiwan wants the United States to
increase its alliance commitments to explicitly protect it against an invasion from China.89
However, if the United States were to do so, this would generate a strong adverse reaction from
China and most likely cause China to attack Taiwan, drawing in the United States as well.90
Decreasing Alliance Commitments
On the other hand, other allies are in favor of decreasing the United States alliance
commitments to them, as they view it to be unnecessarily provocative and infringing on their
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ability to establish good relations with China. For South Korea, it desires that the United States
reduce its military presence in the area and relinquish operational control of the military to
demonstrate its independence as a nation and establish itself as an international power.91 The
Philippines wants the United States to decrease its offensive posture in the South China Sea, as it
views the policy as uncredible and invites China to take provocative actions to test the United
States’ commitments to its allies.92 If the United States were to cede East Asia to China entirely,
it would result in a hegemonic transition that could likely spark a nuclear war.93 However, taking
a strategic and thoughtful approach to the region through actions such as these would likely not
result in any offensive actions from China.94
Geo-Economic Strategy
As for its geo-economic strategy, the United States and China are still engaged in a sort
of trade war, with both sides imposing sanctions on the other over political and ideological
disagreements. President Biden has not removed the tariffs that President Trump placed on
China, and he has begun to take offensive actions against China as well. Recently, the United
States has placed sanctions on China for its human rights abuses, particularly those of the
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Uyghur population.95 In response to United States sanctions, China imposed sanctions on United
States officials.96
Maintaining the Status Quo
If the United States were to maintain the status quo in regard to its geo-economic
strategy, there would likely not be any drastic changes to the global balance of power. As they
currently exist, the sanctions that the United States has placed on China have not had any
substantial effect on the Chinese economy or military, but instead have only resulted in
retaliatory sanctions against the United States.97 Therefore, maintaining the status quo would
only result in more of the same and not ameliorate any of the problems currently in existence.
Increasing Geo-Economic Competition
However, the United States could also increase its geo-economic competition against
China. This strategy could take two different forms: offense or defense. A defensive approach
would involve America imposing more sanctions and tariffs on China, similar to the previous
trade war. Yet, this would be counterproductive, as not only would it negatively affect American
businesses as the previous trade war did, but it would cause China to double down on its
aggressive actions.98 On the other hand, an offensive approach would require America to
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increase production and create supply chains in key industries such as farming and steel
manufacturing.99 Thus, a defensive approach is incompatible with an offensive approach,
because the defensive approach negatively impacts the American economy and workers across
all sectors of the market.100 An offensive approach would reinvigorate the economy and have a
strong potential to allow the United States to pull ahead in the economic race with China.
Decreasing Geo-Economic Competition
Instead of approaching China as an adversary to combat, the United States could also
attempt to welcome China into the international order and help its economy transition to a fully
capitalist system. As China’s economy is expected to quickly surpass that of every other nation,
including the United States, it would be an uphill battle to attempt to mitigate China’s economy
and trade.101 With this understanding, the United States could pursue a policy of constructive
engagement with China and seek to improve its economic relationship with China.
Recommendations
One of the most critical challenges facing the United States is determining its deterrence
posture in regard to China in East Asia. Both America’s alliance strategy and geo-economic
strategy are vital to ensuring Chinese containment. However, there is still contention over
whether or not the United States should even continue its policy of China containment. Below
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are several recommendations for how the United States can alter its containment policy to best
improve relations between allies and prevent war amongst adversaries.
Alliance Strategy
In regard to its alliance strategy, the United States should continue to maintain its
alliances with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Taiwan, yet some adjustments are
necessary to benefit both the United States and its allies, as well as to prevent a war from
breaking out with China. For Japan, the United States should maintain its current force posture
but encourage Japan to increase its Self-Defense Forces and take a more dominant role in the
alliance. This would allow Japan to ensure its defense against China and for the United States to
move away from an outdated strategy of preventing Japanese expansion.102
For South Korea, the United States should decrease the number of troops stationed there
and encourage South Korea to build up its military and modernize its capabilities to transfer
operational control to South Korea formally. In doing so, South Korea would better be able to
establish itself as an independent power in the Asia-Pacific and be able to take charge of its
international relations with North Korea as it sees fit.103
For the Philippines, the United States should rescind its commitment to respond militarily
in the event of any conflict between the Philippines and China in disputed territory in the South
China Sea. The policy only provokes Chinese retaliation to test the United States’ commitment
because it is uncredible. It is not realistic that the United States would launch a war with China if
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Chinese boats were to come into contact with Filipino fishing vessels, and thus China would be
more incentivized to do so. If the United States did respond with military action, that would
likely escalate and cause the needless deaths of many individuals. If the United States did not
respond, China would reveal to the international community that the commitments of the United
States are not to be trusted and thus weaken the American influence and standing in the global
arena. In solidifying the alliance as something to be believed, it will prevent China from taking
aggressive actions towards the Philippines.104
For Taiwan, the United States should make explicit its commitment to defend Taiwan in
the event of a Chinese invasion, because Taiwan is a key part of China’s national identity and
restoring China to its former glory. Establishing a clear guideline with China that the United
States intends to defend Taiwan if and only if there is a direct invasion will deter China from
invading Taiwan because China does not want to get into a full-on war with the United States,
and because China would trust the American commitment to defend Taiwan if it decreased its
uncredible commitments and made explicit its commitment to Taiwan. As Taiwan is
substantially more important than shipping vessels in the South China Sea to both the United
States and China, the United States should make Taiwan a higher priority and give more
attention to protecting it by clarifying its commitment to Taiwan. In doing so, the United States
can further deter Chinese aggression and signal its commitment to protecting democracy and
freedom.105
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Geo-Economic Strategy
As for its geo-economic strategy, there are several actions that the United States should
take. First, the United States should clarify the sanctions that it is imposing on China and the
justifications for doing so. This would decrease the ambiguity surrounding which sectors of the
economy the United States is targeting, and give China further clarity as to what actions could be
taken to reduce the sanctions.106 Second, the United States should make efforts to improve the
American economy through opening its markets and promoting domestic manufacturing,
coupled with economic incentives. In doing so, America would be able to grow its economy and
lessen its reliance on China for trade.107 The details of this could be laid out; however, that is not
the goal of these recommendations. Third, the United States should work with its allies in Asia to
develop a strong international order and promote fair trade. In cooperating with its allies, the
United States can continue to demonstrate its commitment to these nations and to democracy. 108
Through these actions, the United States can improve its economy and the economy of its allies
while being able to continue to hold China accountable for its actions.
Allied Assurance
In taking these actions, the United States would be able to prevent a war with China and
grow its economy without sacrificing the trust and support of its allies in East Asia. These
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policies are specifically tailored to the wants and needs of each ally and demonstrates the
confidence and appreciation that the United States has for its allies. By taking a step back in
Japan and South Korea, the United States will allow those two nations to have a more substantial
role in the formation of their military and increased standing in the international arena. For the
Philippines, the United States will continue to protect the country while adjusting its policy so as
to not unnecessarily cause war. For Taiwan, the United States will end its policy of ambiguity
and make clear that it intends to defend Taiwan. China would not view the United States’ actions
in Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines as aggressive, as the United States is allowing its allies
to have a stronger role in their partnerships. The only action that might cause backlash from
China would be the United States’ declaration to protect Taiwan. However, China is already
operating as if the United States would come to Taiwan’s defense in the event of an invasion,
meaning that the only thing this policy would do is make explicit to everyone the United States’
intentions.109
Adversarial Deterrence
However, by no means does this mean that the United States would give up on its overall
deterrence policy against China. The United States is not abandoning any of its allies, and is in
fact recommitting to Taiwan, which is one of the most contentious issues between the United
States and China. Rather, the United States is backing down from its uncredible commitments to
make certain to China what it will protect and what it will not protect. In doing so, the United
States will increase its deterrence and international credibility through only defending what it can
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and will actually defend.110 In regard to its geo-economic strategy, the United States is
continuing its containment and deterrence posture against China by maintaining its economic
sanctions against the nation. This will signal to China that although the United States is not
wholly opposed to China joining the international order, it is still expected to follow international
norms such as democracy, protection of human rights, and freedom of speech.
Furthermore, even if China were to surpass the United States economically, it would not
spell the end of American global hegemony.111 China still faces several struggles, including its
internal political issues as a result of its one-party Communist system, and its geographical issues
through competitions from neighboring countries such as India and Russia. Thus, even with the
United States decreasing some of its alliance commitments to its partners in East Asia, there is
no need for the United States to fear the decline of its influence internationally, as it will still
remain the dominant power.
Conclusion
Throughout the past few decades, China has solidified itself as the United States’ primary
competitor in terms of military, economy, and international influence. In response, the United
States has pursued a policy of containment through anchoring its alliances with Japan, South
Korea, the Philippines, and Taiwan, and through imposing economic sanctions on China. Now,
the time has come for the United States to re-evaluate its current posture in East Asia and to
determine how to best prevent war with China. To do so, the United States needs to improve its
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alliance strategy and its geo-economic strategy. Concerning its alliances, the United States must
allow its allies to take a stronger role in securing their military and security and resolve
ambiguity about what the United States will defend. As for its geo-economic strategy, the United
States must build up its economy and work together with its East Asian allies to create a global
economy with strong international norms to allow China to integrate itself into the current
system of power. In doing so, the United States will be able to assure its allies of its strong
commitment to them, deter China from taking provocative actions in East Asia, and prevent war.
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